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Objects, artificial systems
and technological mutations
in an evolutionary perspective
Beyond the fundamental and irreductible difference be-
tween the finalist nature of biologic evolution and the
intentional nature of human activity, between the ran-
dom processes that regulate natural forces and the di-
rect control exercised on the technological field, the
most generalized ideas on the isomorphology between
biology and technology have constituted an object of
research of heterogenous disciplinary fields that have
developed some of their specific aspects. Of these stud-
ies, some are only relatively well-known, as is the case
of the theoretic contributions to the concept of progress
in living systems and technological systems.1 In this
direction, a first bio-technological approach began in
the 1930's, with the studies of the German zoologist
Franz,2 the use of comparative study to arrive at a bet-
ter understanding of biological evolution; the term
«biotechnical progress» was introduced in this case to
define the structural and functional improvements of
organisms which could be measured through their effi-
ciency.
The meaning of progress in living systems and in
technology immediately became the object of specific
theoretic speculation, especially in the Soviet Union,
from the seventies on, and developed into studies on
the essential similarities related to common tendencies
toward a growing complexity, the growth of autono-
my and progressive reliability.3
Ample and articled difusión was given, on the con-
trary, to studies developed in the field of bionics, where
the simulation of vital processes has represented not an
approach of a purely cognitive nature but rather an
operative programme which allows translation of iso-
morphisms between organic evolution and technology
into elements of design of the artificial.
At the basis of these diverse ambits of research,
however, we can read that common methodology that
consists in the fact of considering a biologic system to
be examined as a prototype from which to derive a
model which is successively interpreted in the project
or in the study of an artificial system. The project or
the interpretation thus derived do not have the inten-
tion of directly furnishing the resolutive phase of a
possible technological advance. Actually, once individ-
ualized, a biological principle that seems useful only
furnishes an orientating scheme, a kind of frame for
the projective or conceptual solution. Afterwards, it is
hoped that the successive developments and the in-
creases in a specific direction will produce an autono-
mous system in relation to the original biological sys-
tem from which one had parted. Biology, the first of
the sciences to face the theme of design, offers in this
sense an apparatus extraordinarily rich in conceptual
instruments: morphological changes, information
transmission, as well as the concepts of completeness,
coherence, correlation and integration. The indispen-
sable premise rests, naturally, on the knowledge of that
part of biology from which the model is to be taken, to
make a procedure possible that implies a series of suc-
cessive phases: the selection of the biological system
that can be investigated by virtue of the compatibility
with its artificial analogue; the process of abstraction
necessary to define the limits of the system investigat-
ed; the operation of translating by which the represen-
tation of the model is produced. From the last of these
phases, therefore, it is possible to go to the interpreta-
tion of the model on the basis of the construction of a
corresponding artificial system and, finally, to its veri-
fication. The analogical approach can also give place
to positive retroactions in the system taken as a model
and by extension in the disciplinary field to which it
belongs, which, in its turn, can lend itself to new inter-
pretations.
To the fields of comparison described till now
—biology and technology— at least a third discipline
has been added that has obtained, parting from a met-
aphoric construction, autonomous and relevant devel-
opments: economy. The use of the term «evolutive the-
ory» applied to economic studies as an alternative to
orthodox theories has been, in its turn, the sign that
natural sciences can constitute sources of key concepts
1. Urbanek, A., «Morpho-Physiological Progress», in
Nitecki, M. E., Evolutionary Progress, The University of Chica-
go Press, Chicago, 1988, p. 209.
2. Franz, V, «Zum jetzigen Stand der Theorie von biotech-
nischen Fortschritt a der Pflanzen und Tiergeschichte», Biologia
Generate, 19 : 3 (1935).
3. Cfr. Zavadski, K. M., «On the progress in living and tech-
nical systems», in Zavadski, K. M. and Meleschenko, Y. U.
(eds.), Theoretical Problems of Progressive Development in Liv-
ing Nature and Technology, Nauka, Leningrad, 1970, pp. 3-38.
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common to diverse disciplinary fields, perpetuating an
approach which has an antecedent in the contamina-
tion between the thinking of Malthus and Darwin.
Fruitful contacts between biology and technology have
set in motion elaborations that have invested as much
the laws of technological mutation as the modes
through which technological development leans on
economic implications.4
In a position uncomfortably placed between the
operativity of bionics and the formalization of «evolu-
tionary» economic theories, we place the field of those
speculative studies which, while they do not have the
autonomy of a unitary corpus, can be recjuced to the
denomination of «technological Darwinism» a denom-
ination that is surely not the index of the organicity of
the theoretic contributions it gathers —quite heteroge-
neous on the other hand— but rather the common ap-
proach to the rereading, on the basis of the metaphor
taken from the theory of evolution and taking from it
new elements of knowledge, the way that objects and
artificial systems evolve.
The meaning and some possible implications of this
approach are the object of analysis of this paper.
Evolution and technology
In the construction of all possible analogies, and,
therefore those that can exist between biology and
technology, between evolution of the living and artifi-
cial evolution, we have said that it is necessary to have
decided a priori, or maybe only to have intuited, that
area beyond logic and experience where it seems licit
to construct similarity.
Consequently, why is it possible to believe that the
ambit of technological mutation can obtain an increase
of knowledge from the analogy with a model, that of
evolution, that comes from biology?
Some basic rules of comparison between biological
evolution and technological change really evidence all
its debatable aspects. A real intellectual trap, analogies
of this kind offer, in Stephen Jay Gould's opinion, ex-
amples of effects more harmful than useful. «Biologic
evolution —writes Gould— is a bad example of cul-
tural change»,5 and for reasons that could not be more
radical: the rythm of cultural evolution has timings
enormously and incomparably faster than any biologi-
cal change; cultural evolution, in second place, is
Lamarckian, with results from one generation that are
transmitted directly to the next provoking that speed
of change unknown to nature: biologic evolution is in
fact indirect and Darwinian, and the favourable char-
acteristics are transmitted to descendents only if they
have been casually originated from genetic changes.
Finally, biological evolution is a process of constant
divergence; while the tree of culture can surely diverge
in its ramifications, it can also converge, reunify, and
recover reversible pasts.
Why therefore, in spite of these irresoluble differ-
ences that discourage more than stimulate comparison,
does it seem not only possible but even profitable to
recur to analogy?
The basic motivation rests on the recognition that
as much cultural evolution, of which material culture
forms part, as biological evolution are systems of his-
torical change. Both are, as the root of the word «evo-
lution» suggests, forms of deployment from which it is
possible to interpret or reconstruct the order.
The comparison with biology and some of its prin-
ciples formulated in the Darwinian theory and succes-
sive modern synthesis is not useful, therefore, for the
explanation of technological change. What is demand-
ed, at the most, is whether from the two different dis-
ciplinary fields, the two groups of information, it is
possible to obtain profound elements common to the
organization of both, so that it becomes possible to
recognize the principles of general structure that are
the basis of all systems that evolve historically,xsearch-
ing for the possible regularities that govern the laws of
change, independently of the nature of the system con-
sidered.
There is no similarity, therefore, to be shown be-
tween organisms and machines, between natural and
artificial systems. But in the light of contemporary ad-
vances of epistemològic studies on the general nature
of change not only of biological but also of cultural
systems, it is plausible to believe, as Gould writes,
that, at the base of structurally similar systems that
proceed by diverse evident rules, there are general prin-
ciples. True unity does not reside in erroneous applica-
tions of these evident rules (such as natural selection)
4. See, for example, Di Bernardo, B. and Rullani, E., «Evo-
luzione: un nuovo paradigma per la teoria dell'impresa e del
cambiamento tecnológico», Economia e Política Industríale, 42,
1984, pp. 39-106.
5. Gould, S. J., «II pollice del panda delia tecnologia», in
Bravo Brontosauro, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1992, p. 63.
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to strange ambits (such as technological change), but
rather in the search for more general rules of structure
and change.6
Darwin among machines
The most widely quoted antecedent and obligatory ref-
erence for every study oriented toward the construc-
tion of an analogy between technological evolution
and biological evolution are always the writings of
Samuel Butler, an enthusiastic convert to Darwin's ev-
olutionism who immediately became one of its major
and most sarcastic critics, prefering positions closer to
the theories of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. In the long and
tortuous road that saw him go from the first enthusi-
astic and convinced supporter of Darwinism to bitter
opposer and devout Lamarckist, Butler expressed his
position in the biological debate rereading technologi-
cal evolution as an analogy of natural evolution.
Mainly grouped together in the 1872 novel Ere-
whon,7 these ideas had been elaborated a decade be-
fore, and published in the form of the essays «Darwin
among the Machines»8 and «Lucubrado Ebria».9 In
the first there already appeared the more important el-
ements of the literary metaphor between Darwin's the-
ory of evolution and the evolution of machines: the
introduction of the expressions «mechanical life, me-
chanical kingdom, mechanical world», recognized and
sanctioned the autonomy of a universe that, like the
animal and vegetable kingdoms, could lend itself to
classification according to genera, subgenera, and spe-
cies.
The recognition of a specific mechanical world in
the image of nature also induced Butler to individuate
a field of investigation where it would be possible to
discover those intermediate links that tie together ma-
chines of diverse species; where it could be demonstrat-
ed that selection carried out by humanity develops the
same function as natural selection; where the study of
atrophied or useless mechanical organs could, in con-
sequence, help to recognize the descendence from an-
cestral types passed on to a new phase of mechanical
existence.10
The elements Butler drew from the theory of evolu-
tion to draw his metaphorical comparison were essen-
tially configured from the possibility of genealògic re-
construction of diversification in the mechanical
kingdom, from the existence of a selective mechanism
applied by humanity that permits survival of the fittest
in a Darwinian sense, and, finally, from the recogni-
tion of a concept of use and disuse —of Lamarckian
fabrication— applicable to the evolution of artificial
organs.
To these analogies is added the reference to com-
parison in morphological terms, individuated in the
supposed progressive decrease in size which in a simi-
lar way would have accompanied the evolution of
some invertebrates and the development of machines,"
that overcame the apparent impossibility of compar-
ing the reproductive capacity of living organisms.
The central theme elaborated in these essays —the
development of technology— reappears in the chapters
of Erewhon, where the theory of evolution is applied
to the mechanical field with the ultimate aim of show-
ing the evident absurdity of treating machines like or-
ganisms and, consequently, organisms like machines:
an objective that constituted an implicit dependence
on the mechanism which Butler recognized in Darwin's
theory.
The point of departure of Butler's criticism is the
conventional analogy between machines and organ-
isms. In an observation which is even generic, both
genera show, in fact, evident common properties: as
much machines as plants as animals depend on exter-
nal sources of energy; all of them regulate and control
their activities; if living organisms alone seem capable
of autonomous reproduction, it is true, however, that
in some cases this only happens on the basis of the
mediation of other organisms. If a true difference must
be pointed out, this seems linked not to intrinsic prop-
erties but rather to the different speed at which organ-
6. Ibid., p. 64.
7. Butler, S., Erewhon, London, 1872.
8. Cellarius, pseudonym of Butler, S., «Darwin among the
Machines», The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 13 June
1863. Amplified and rewritten, the essay was republished later
with the title of «The Mechanical Creation», The Reasoner, Lon-
don, July 1885. The Italian translation to which I here refer is
contained in / classici Adelphi 1963-64, Adelphi, Milan, 1964,
pp. 141-150.
9. Butler, S., «Lucubratio Ebria», The Press, Christchurch,
New Zealand, 29 July 1865.
10. Cfr. Butler, S., «Darwin e le macchine», op. at., p. 143.
11. «It is true that in our days there are already machines
that are used to bring new machines into the world, and that
become the parents of other machines, often of the same species»
(Butler, S., «Darwin e le macchine», p. 148).
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isms and machines evolve. The latter are, in fact, sub-
ject to a very fast evolution that can escape from the
control of humanity, favouring —an expression belov-
ed by Butler— machine supremacy.
Beyond Butler's irony and his criticism of evolu-
tionism, a later theme, also elaborated in Erewhon,
seems —in the light of contemporary vision— clearly
anticipatory: the idea of the machine as an extracor-
poral organ, an artificial prolongation of physiologi-
cal capacities. See, for example, how the analogy be-
tween tools and organs is developed according to
Butler:
See the man who digs with a plow: the straight fore-
arm has become artificially prolonged and the hand has
become a union. The hilt of the plow is like the protu-
berance that there is above the arm, the handle is an
added bone, and the oblong iron blade is the new form
the hand takes on, a form that allows its holder to turn
over the earth in a way which would be impossible with
his original hand.
And he adds: «A machine is only a suplementary
organ; here you have the nature and the function of
machines.»12 The machine appears, therefore, as a su-
perior phase of the development of humanity, whose
overall evolution —in coherence with the positions as-
sumed by Butler— eventually assumes markedly
Lamarckian characteristics: the tools of humanity, ex-
tracorporeal organs, are developed at the same time as
the biological organs, through decided efforts and not
through blind chance. Use and disuse can also inter-
vene in the definition of residual or rudimentary or-
gans of which Butler did not cease to give significant,
although limited, examples.
From the reading of Butler's metaphors, beyond
their objectives and the meaning of the specific argu-
ment, there clearly emerge some themes that justify a
first level of acceptability of an evolving reading ex-
tended to material culture. This is thus because of the
vision of the supremacy of machines, or because of the
idea of the development of manufacturing and ma-
chines according to a series of unfoldings of a succes-
sive order. The intuition of the continuum «man-arto-
artificial» contributes to define a new perspective,
where the classic metaphor of body as machine (which
in its turn historically substituted the preceding image
of body as metaphor of the cosmos) paradoxally loses
its metaphorical integrity to gain a real consistency.
The homologation of any object, any tool or artifact,
to a prosthesis, to that which can substitute or potenti-
ate the human organ, conceptually eliminates in fact
the meaning of the metaphor: human body and extra-
corporal organs, unopposed, eventually share the same
nature from the functional point of view.
The implications and advances that modernity of-
fers to this perspective are well known: the prosthesis
is expansive and substitutes miserable organs, as a wit-
ness of the history of medicine, or prolongs and poten-
tiates the missing human organ, tends to copy and sub-
stitute codes and programmes, insinuating themselves
more deeply into the life process.13
The classic darwinian analogy: trial and error
The model on which the conventional analogy of the
evolution of manufacture is most often constructed
originates from the three fundamental observations
elaborated by Darwin in The Origin of Species.
The first reveals that
every living being naturally propagates in such a rapid
progression that, if no natural causes of destruction in-
tervene, the Earth would soon be covered by the proge-
ny of one single couple,14
and it is known how, from this observation (and the
suggestion from the essay by Robert Malthus15 where
it was affirmed that human society grows at a more
rapid rate than the means of survival available), Dar-
win drew that concept of «the struggle for existence»
destined to become a principle of general order in his
theory.
The second important observation in fact implies
that between the individuals of diverse species there
must take place a struggle for survival, as much in the
form of competition of the young individuals to reach
maturity as in the form of reproductive superiority.
12. Butler, S., Erewhon, Adelphi, Milan, 1965 and 1975,
p. 198.
13. Cfr. Attali, J., L'ordine Cannibals. Vita e marte delta
medicina, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1980, p. 247.
14. Darwin, C., L'origine delle specie, Bollati Boringhieri,
Turin, 1967, p. 133.
15. Malthus, R., An Essay on the Principle of Population,
London, 1798.
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The third observation draws, finally, the concept of
variation: individuals present diverse characteristics,
some beneficial in terms of struggle for survival, some
unfavourable; individuals with advantages have in this
sense more possibilities of reproducing and hereditally
transmitting the favourable characteristics they pos-
sess, while the unfavourable modifications are destined
to disappear.
Darwin's most relevant intuition was, however,
that of transforming the differences between individu-
als in the ambit of a species to differences between spe-
cies in space and time.16 Therefore, due to the fact that
evolutionary change represents the result of variation
between species and the successive alterations in time,
Darwin was able to describe a mechanics and kinetics
of the transformation of variation, the principle of
heredity and the principle of natural selection.17
These key concepts of Darwin's theory find a first
and partial application in the field of material culture
thanks to systematic studies of anthropological and
archaeological nature about the modalities with which
tools had been produced and developed in primitive
cultures. An approach which, parting from schematic
reconstructions of manufacture, is not lacking in very
specific elaborations and hypotheses, such as the con-
cept of the «orthogenesis of tools» formulated by Le-
roi-Gourhan, who, «struck by the analogy with some
paleontològic evolutions», in this way admitted as a
hypothesis a general technical fact.18
The variability of the products of human activity
being universally recognized, a further step in the anal-
ogy between organic evolution and technological evo-
lution consists of the identification of heredity with the
copy.1' Tools constitute in fact the copy of preceding
models, assuring an exact reproduction of the types in
the interior of some primitive societies, based on not
only social stability, but also on forms of material pro-
duction. This stability could constitute the equivalent
in technological terms of the stability of form that ge-
netic heredity confers. However, even in the stability
of the sequences of primitive objects —and analogous-
ly with all that takes place with living organisms—, it
is licit to expect the appearance of some small modifi-
cation in the copies and to read variations which can
be assimilated to those described by Darwin: that is to
say, minimum modifications which, if they are able to
confer an advantage, tend to be selected as favourable.
Not even here is it necessary for all variations that arise
in copies be favourable. Observes Steadman:
It is possible that variations be introduced quite ac-
cidentally, by chance, and that it is the mechanism of
selection that guarantees the diffusion of the favoura-
ble characteristic and the elimination of the unfavoura-
ble.20
This form of analogy applied to manufacture also
introduces a specific reading of the relationship be-
tween the manufacture and the type, between the copy
and the model.
If the type constitutes that which is effectively
transmitted with the copy, it is licit to consider it as the
group of genetic instructions transmitted. The analogy
would suggest at the same time that as to the fact of
manufacture we could speak of a process of transmis-
sion of information inherent to its function and pro-
duction, informations that together define the «guide
model» to which the artisan —we are still looking at
pre-industrial societies— refers.
In this sense, it is not the concrete manufacture that
evolves, but rather the abstract type to which specific
manufacture corresponds. The distinction offered by
biology between genotype, as a description of the spe-
cies transmitted by biologic heredity, and phenotype,
which physically specifies the genotype's information,
offers the model of an analogous distinction between
type and concrete manufacture, and introduces the
theme of the difference between hereditary variations
and environment-induced modifications. We must
briefly remember how, in nature, the genotype, that is,
the group of instructions constituted by the genes, is
physically carried out by the phenotype, the process of
development of the system of which is, however, flexi-
ble enough to support the direct environmental condi-
tioners. Such induced variations are not, however,
transmitted to descendents.
As to manufactures, it is analogously noticeable
that even if an abstract type exists, an a priori form, it
is possible to carry out diverse phenotypes on the ba-
16. Cft. Lewontin, R. C., «Evoluzione», Enciclopedia Ei-
naudi, vol. V, Einaudi, Turin, 1978, p. 1013.
17. Ibid., p. 1014.
18. Cfr. Leroi-Gourhan, A., // gesto e la parola. Técnica e
linguaggio, vol. I, Einaudi, Turin, 1977, p. 159.
19. Cfr. Steadman, P., L'evoluzione del design. L'analogia
biológica in architettura e nelle arti applicate, Liguori, Naples,
1988, p. 112.
20. Ibid.
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sis, for example, of locally available materials. Envi-
ronmental factors, to quote Steadman,
acting on the production or development of manufac-
ture, will plausibly have as a consequence slight chang-
es or variations in form between an object of a deter-
mined type and another. (If such variations can be
«hereditary» in the case of technology, is a rather more
complicated question.)21
Overcoming the doubt expressed by Philip Stead-
man, it is really essential that in the products of human
activity —as compared to what happens in nature—
modifications and variations induced by specific envi-
ronmental conditions can be directly inherited by the
products of succeeding generations.
From the general principles of Darwinian theory
there still remains to be considered the true nucleus,
that principle of natural selection which flows togeth-
er in the process of trial and error, where trials (varia-
bility) are assured by the appearance of variation, and
errors (the unfit) are eliminated. The metaphoric ap-
plication of the concept of selection illuminates its
double usefulness as a conceptual tool: on the one
hand, it develops the conventional role in light of the
function of intentional choice carried out by humanity
or by the markets to the products of its activity; on the
other, it opens up a perspective that Steadman defines
as an ecological analogy,22 capable of reading the pro-
gressive «adaption» of manufactures operating on the
scale of interrelationships between form, function, and
environment.
A natural history of manufactures
In the diverse approaches initially interlaced in Samuel
Butler's metaphors, Herbert Spencer's first classifica-
tions of anthropological studies and suggestions, the
centrality of manufacture as a primary unit of the evo-
lution of technology remains unaltered.
It is possible in this sense to recognize that a part of
the contributions in the direction of technological Dar-
winism converges at first with a vein —destined to re-
new itself in time— which draws the evolution of the
products of human activity as a genealògic reconstruc-
tion of the families of manufactures, where these have
the same importance as plants and animals in organic
evolution.23
Natural history appears in this sense as the source
from which to obtain a method or system to classify
genera, species and varieties, that can lend itself to or-
dering manufactures from correlative forms.
The sequence from simple to complex, from homo-
geneous to heterogeneous is recognized nowadays as
the informing principle of the scale of material
progress. The oldest manufactures and their descend-
ents can in this way be ordered in progressive and con-
tinuous series that make the evolution of culture visi-
ble, from primitive states to the highest forms of
civilization.
The Pitt-Rivers collection of manufactures2'1 consti-
tutes one of the first examples of the scientific organi-
zation of the classification of a group of manufactures
according to an evolutionary scheme.
Possibly inspired by the ethnographic exhibitions
for the Great Exhibition, Pitt-Rivers had the original
idea of a collection of tools, instruments and invention
towards 1852, when he was charged with experiment-
ing with new models of rifles for the British Army, and
preparing an instruction manual. While he was exam-
ining the historical development of modern arms, Pitt-
Rivers concentrated on the gradualness and slowness
of the process of perfection, concentrated on small ad-
vances in yield and minimum modifications in the joint
organization of components. From this came the idea
that analogous principles could govern the develop-
ment of other manufactures, and then his interest for
collecting and classifying, to furnish a reconstruction
of their relationships and their historical origins.
As in the organisms studied by natural history, so
in relation to manufactures the problem of the missing
links was proposed and the difficulty to establish in
what measure an object was ideal for insertion in a se-
quence. Among the greatest criticisms of the theory of
evolution, that which referred to evident gaps of inter-
mediate forms between existing species constituted
from the beginning a critical point which Darwin him-
self had anticipated in The Origin of Species analyzing
the imperfection of geologic documentation.25
21. Ibid., pp. 113-114.
22. Steadman, P., op. at., p. 89.
23. Cfr. Basalla, G., L'evoluzione delia tecnologia. Cause,
modalità e effeti del progresso tecnológico, Rizzoli, Milan, 1991,
p. 49.
24. Cfr. Pitt-Rivers, Augustus-Henry (Lane Fox), The Evo-
lution of Culture and Other Essays, Oxford, 1906.
25. Darwin, C, op. cit., p. 371.
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In any case, it was still an essential premise that
nature does not jump, that the progress of evolution is
always gradual and proceeds by small improvements.
Pitt-Rivers estimated that this same gradual evolution
is verified in primitive manufacture, and that only the
disappearance of the intermediate forms, as in the ex-
tinction of transition species of animals or vegetables,
gave the false impression of objects «invented» sepa-
rately and independently.26 Analogously, modern in-
ventions lent themselves to interpretations as the result
of an evolution by small phases, traceable as much in
intermediate stages of thought process as in phases of
experimentation.
Form is in any case the principal order in Pitt-Riv-
ers' sequences, where tools are shown in in a correla-
tive succession organized on the basis of formal devia-
tions, imperceptible or perceptible. The image that
derives from this —at least as to primitive manufac-
tures— is that of a slow succession, of a formation of
sequences which —without a preconceived design—
suffer a process of selection applied by humanity, ca-
pable of carrying out more suitable manufactures for
specific ends, of discarding the less fit, of gradually
modifying the «survivors». In the progressive variation
of objects and in the possibility of reconstructing their
history there is, even here, an implicit interpretation of
the unity of change, which is destined in time to be the
object of controversies as much in biology as in tech-
nology.27
Beyond the enthusiastic adherence to the idea of
the evolution of manufactures, Pitt-Rivers' work
shows the evident limits of a reductive use of the theo-
ry of evolution, which ends up confined to a «paleon-
tològic» reconstruction of some types of tools. At the
same time, these studies develop a positive function,
offering an original concept destined to last: after hav-
ing overcome the classifying fever that there is at the
base of the many taxonomies of objects, what remains
is, in the end, the recognition of a statute of the exist-
ence of manufactures, which, from inert entities that
respond to need, becomes a significant phase of a se-
quence that can be retroactively covered step by step,
toward the genesis of manufacture itself.
Genetics of the industrial object
Almost a century after Pitt-Rivers' classification, that
which can be defined as a genetics of industrial prod-
ucts has taken shape in the work of Yves Deforge,
where the comprehension of the industrial object
comes from the approach of an evolutionary dimen-
sion that becomes the essential condition for a reflec-
tion on industrial techniques and on the products de-
rived from them.28
Contrary to most analogies used till then, for De-
forge the integration of the concept of evolution takes
place through the development of real, if rudimentary,
operative instruments: the notion of genetic descend-
ence, of the law of evolution, of the networks of rela-
tionships of the object with the system of which it
forms a part.
The genetic descent of the industrial object seems
to be made up of objects which have the same function
or use and which practice the same «principle». For
this latter a specific definition has been introduced,
that is, technologic essence, which is manifested
through solutions and forms that make it appear be-
tween the expression of the problem and the achieved
solution.2' The constituting principle of a genetic line
can consequently be individuated in a patent of inven-
tion or —more freely— in a type, even if the base nev-
er ceases to be the physico-chemical phenomenon acti-
vated by the object itself. For the automobile, for ex-
ample, the principle that founds a descendence could
be a stable type, or a fundamental component such as
the engine and its modes of functioning, or even a
structural characteristic. Once this principle has been
established, the genealògic line is presented as a chron-
ologic order of objects that share a same use. From the
origin of a line to its abandonment or interruption, the
objects that form a part of it follow a succession which
goes in the direction of successive improvements.
These improvements which are introduced in the envi-
ronment of artificial objects are
26. Cfr. Steadman, P., op. at., p. 124.
27. Cfr. Balfour, H., introduction to Pitt-Rivers, A., op. cit.,
pp. vii-viii.
28. Deforge, Y., Tecfmoiogie et génétique de l'objet indus-
triel, Maloine, Paris, 1985.
29. Ibid., p. 101.
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a sort of formalism, by which advances and regres-
sions, convergences and divergences of the lines would
be no more than micro-evolutions in a line of general
evolution.30
A second conceptual instrument formulated by De-
forge, the laws of evolution, refers to the existence of
many descendències evolved from industrial objects,
whose solutions constitute examples of progressive
autonomy and concretion. The introduction of the lat-
ter term is directly related to the process of «from ab-
stract to concrete» elaborated by Gilbert Simondon in
the analysis of the evolution of technical objects. In Si-
mondon's formulation, the technical object progresses
toward solutions in which functions enter into a mutu-
al relationship, they complement one another, they
fuse together, till they constitute a group of forms and
functions oriented toward a total integration, toward
a progressive closure of the system they make up.
Besides their progressive integration, objects also
present an increase in autonomy of function which is
translated into a tendency to auto-regulation —in
strict analogy with living organisms— to be under-
stood as a capacity to respond to internal and external
upheavals, to the improvement in physical relation-
ships between parts, and even to a relative capacity for
autosufficiency which «naturalizes» the object, which
can show itself to be able to autonomously produce
energy for functioning, or to repair itself. Evolution
from the primitive form of the technical object, the
abstract form in a word, to the concrete form, allow us
to enounce laws —along with Simondon— that, as we
have seen, describe a process that moves in the direc-
tion of the reduction of dimensions, of energetic au-
tonomy.31 Deforge reconduces the same evolutionary
laws of self-sufficiency, of self-regulation, and of cor-
relation of parts toward a more general concept of
«self-adaptation»,32 where the image of an integrated
unit made up of both the industrial object and its envi-
ronment take form.
A third conceptual too] introduced by Deforge re-
sponds to the fact of the need of reconstruction —in a
specific phase of the evolution of an industrial object—
the network of relationships which that object estab-
lishes with its environment, that is to say the wider en-
vironment of which the production, consumer, and use
system form part. A point of view and a method that
are proper to the study of phenomena that extend over
long periods of time and help to define the milieu asso-
cié of the phenomenon under consideration,33 which in
this case is configured like the network of the recipro-
cal relationships that the object carries out with each
subsystem of the wider industrial system. If, of the in-
struments proposed by Deforge, the two first admit a
diachronic and synchronic vision of the evolution of
the descendents of industrial products (which appear
as the result as much of the context of which they form
a part as of a genetic continuum), it is, however, the
latter which, with the hypothesis of the reconstruction
of the environment associated with the object, prefig-
ures the development of a systematic view. And if this
global perspective remains —in Deforge's study— re-
ally only sketched out, at least the points of view begin
to multiply, so that products and their genealogies
evolve in the interior of a production system, machines
in a system of use, objects in a consumer system, thus
drawing the partial and multiple readings destined, on
the basis of contemporary or later theoretic contribu-
tions, to flow together into a unitary vision of system-
atic approaches.
From the demography of objects
to technical species
In the construction hypothesis of a theory of objects
with a sociològic nature, Abraham Moles introduced a
few decades ago the concept of «demography of ob-
jects», in the etymological sense of the description of
populations and their relative variations. Inside a clas-
sificatory approach to objects, on the basis of a will-
ingly forced analogy, species and subspecies, rates of
birth and aging of products are prefigured, till we ar-
rive at a possible approach between the idea of object
maintenance and preventive medicine.34 The characrer-
30. Ibid., p. 72.
31. See the first chapter of Simondon's, G., classic work Du
mode ¿'existence des objets techniques, Aubier Montaigne, Par-
is, 1969.
32. Cfr. Deforge, Y., «Simondon et les questions vives de
l'actualíté», epilogue to Simondon, G., op. at., ed. 1989, p. 284.
33. The term milieu associé has its definite introduction by
Simondon, G., op. at., p. 57.
34. Cfr. Moles, A., «Objet et communication», in AA.VV,
Les objets. Communication, n. 13, Editions du Seuil, Paris,
1969, p. 11 (special translation «Objeto y comunicación», in
Comunicaciones. Los objetos, Tiempo Contemporáneo, Buenos
Aires, 1971).
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istics of a demography of artificial products drawn by
Moles, and of the implicit possible classification meth-
ods,35 already led to at least two kinds of useful con-
siderations for a systematic interpretation: in the first
place the introduction itself of the idea of demography
prefigured an ecological opening, in the sense of a dis-
cipline that considers the balance of species, of their
relationships, of the modifications of some in respect
to others. From this point of view, populations of ob-
jects seemed an unlimited field of analysis for an ap-
proach with interdisciplinary instruments. In the sec-
ond place, those same populations presented —even
for a superficial observer— a problem unknown to tra-
ditional ecology: that is to say, the continuous and ac-
celerated appearance of new artificial species, as a
counterpoint to the relative fixity of living species.
The classificatory meaning that Moles wished to
give to artificial species is at least lined up with anoth-
er definition formulated in those same years. The con-
cept of «technical species», elaborated in Gilbert Si-
mondon's classic work,36 which uses a terminological
repertory taken from the field of biology to construct
—in the line of analogy, but with complete disciplinary
autonomy— modes through which the technical object
defines its status of existence.
The technical species in this sense defines a first and
summary distinction between objects on the basis of
their practical purpose, a distinction which according
to Simondon gives an illusory specificity,37 given that
use joins very diverse structures and uses.
If the individuality of the technical object described
by Simondon, the specificity in the sense of belonging
to a species, shows itself as unstable, that firmly reaf-
firms the idea that every technical object is defined
through its genesis.38 The reading of Simondon has the
merit of allowing a liberation of the conventional sense
of belonging to a species which precedes the classifi-
cating operation. The use of what is called a genetic
method has, in fact, the primary objective of avoiding
the use of a classifying model that otherwise would in-
tervene after the genesis of objects to distribute them
all in genera and species.
On the contrary, the technical object is seen in the
dynamic dimension of its evolution: as in a philo-ge-
netic line, the object contains in itself structures and
schemes that determine its successive developments.
The evolution prefigured by Simondon's analysis
moves in the direction of few specific types, which are
the result of a process of differentiation and of progres-
sive organization. But like all evolution, this one also
exposes the problem of the absolute origin, which in
Simondon's examination takes the form of a specific
technical reality. The absolute beginning is thus re-led
to an act of invention. The origin of a descent of tech-
nical objects is marked by a synthetic act of invention
which originates a technical essence.39 This essence is
recognizable by its stability in a line that evolves and
by its capacity for the production of structures and
forms by «progressive saturation». The primitive tech-
nical object is in fact compared to a non-saturated sys-
tem whose successive improvements make up the phas-
es towards saturation of the whole: from this comes
the image of the object as a possessor of «fertility»
proper of a «non-saturation» that allows it to accede
to posterity. If the object appears to suffer changes and
alterations of its exterior, these are really the phases of
a progression which gives form to a family which has
as its progenitor the primitive technical object. An ev-
olution that in this way seems definable as a «natural
technical evolution».40
Technical kingdom and techno-evolution
Gilbert Hottois, on the contrary, has introduced the
specificity of technique as a «kingdom»,41 observing its
intrinsic tendency to constitute itself into an autartic
environment, isolated and contemporaneously orient-
ed toward the proliferation and assimilation of that
which surrounds it. If it is true that technique tends to
be substituted in some parts of the natural ecosystem
into which it inserts itself, if the universality of the
technical environment is able to produce the image of
another nature,42 it seems licit to define its environ-
ment as a kingdom, in the image of the animal and veg-
etable kingdoms.
35. Ibid., p. 10.
36. Simondon, G., Du mode ¿'existence des objets tech-
niques, op. cit.
37. Ibid., p. 19.
38. Ibid., p. 20.
39. Ibid., p. 43.
40. Ibid.
41. Cfr. Hottois, G., Le signe et la technique. La philoso-
phie a l'épreuve de la technique, Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1984,
p. 120.
42. Cfr. Ellul, J., Le système technicien, Caiman-Levy, Paris,
1977, p. 350.
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The use of the term «kingdom» is not used here to
define limits, but rather to evoke an image of organic
homogeneity, of specificity, of growth dynamics, au-
tonomy and difference, where technique is recogniza-
ble. The autonomy of the technical kingdom is not syn-
onymous with absence of interchange with other
kingdoms, rather the contrary: the confrontation of
bio-evolution with techno-evolution43 can show itself
to be clarifying.
At a first level, the analogy between the two forms
of evolution seems based on intuited common traits:
the morphologic continuity that incorporates novelties
and perpetuates the old forms (the evolution of a spe-
cies would correspond in this case to the appearance
of manufactures); the occupation of ecological niches
according to a systematic sense which is applicable as
much to life as to technique (if on the one hand it is
possible to assist at the survival of a living species in
the appropriate micro-habitat, on the other a technical
species is only conceivable inside infrastructures that
assure its reproductive processes, conservation, and
nourishment); a general principle of the struggle for
survival (in which the fittest imposes itself in the bio-
logic as well as the technologic world); the tendency to
morphophilia, that is to say, the extraordinary abun-
dance of forms, of interspecies variations, is not always
justified by the demands of function and adaptation;
the abundance of creations which do not always find
an application (on the one hand the unfavourable or
recessive variations, on the other patents); the combin-
ing nature of innovations (which as much in biology as
in technology can reorganize everything that already
exists); the presence of periods of stability and evolu-
tionary balance, the sudden discontinuities and muta-
tion bounds (the step to a new theoretic system or the
appearance of a new species of technical objects); fi-
nally, the idea of evolution as a process that becomes
progressively more complex.44
What perspectives does an analogic procedure of
this type open up?
Gilbert Hottois formulates the hypothesis from
multiple reading plans. In the first place, following the
tracks of the hypothesis of a zoological origin, so
to say, of technique, as that formulated by Leroi-
Gourhan,45 it is possible to sink the roots of the ap-
pearance of technique in bio-evolution itself, from
which would be drawn a continuity of principle be-
tween the natural and the artificial. In second place,
formal resemblances allow the reconstruction of the
stages of techno-evolution assimilable by analogy to
bio-evolution.
Finally, it seems legitimate to formulate the hypoth-
esis that transformations which technique can intro-
duce are susceptible of acquiring a mutational and
properly evolutionary nature, completely different
from the continuity implicit in cultural and historical
transformations.46 The evolutionary perspective in this
sense invites an introduction of a category of disconti-
nuity, of distance, of strangeness —proper, exactly, of
the concept of mutation taken from biology— which,
as Gilbert Hottois observes, shows itself to be deeper
than any historical hiatus.47 In this sense, the history of
techniques does not seem to have ever known disconti-
nuity and the deep sense of fracture that mutation im-
plies.
Contemporaneously, the same evolutionary per-
spective is opposed to a conception of technical
growth as a string of accurate, monolithic, almost «in-
sular» innovations, as Hottois defines them. The view
that the technical process provokes is, therefore, a
complex one: growth becomes a «combining prolifera-
tion that acts in very sense», where every new inven-
tion is placed on a crossroads of many technical vec-
tors, where each expantion is fruit of forces and
potentials that belong to the technical environment on
the whole. A process that can be assimilated to a form
of almost spontaneous self-growth, product of a pro-
liferating combination, «chance and causal at the same
time»,48 which proposes the image of a physis and
points at the profound diversity of this view of the
technical kingdom compared to traditional concepts,
anchored in the creative dynamism of individual sub-
jectivity.
43. The term «techno-evolution» has been introduced by
Lem, S., Summa Technologiae, Insel, Frankfurt amb Main, 1976.
44. Cfr. Hottois, G., op. cit., pp. 29 and succs.
45. In the first appearance of tools and manufactures it is
possible to read a direct prolongation of the morphologic evolu-
tion and biologic functions. See Leroi-Gourhan, A., op. cit.
46. Hottois, G., op. cit., p. 132.
47. Ibid., p. 135.
48. Cfr. Ellul, J., op. cit., pp. 229-248.
89
A darwinian metaphor. Objects, artificial systems and technological mutations in an evolutionary perspective
Towards a neo-darwinian sense of «technology»
The concept of technology itself, to be understood as
the set of a population of material and non-material
systems, has been placed in a neo-Darwinian perspec-
tive, the theoric bases of which are represented by the
synthesis of the graduality and discontinuity of evolu-
tion.
Technology shows itself to be particularly adapted
to these applications, above all if it is understood, as
Luciano Gallino writes,
as a set of organs, and more analytically of traits, prop-
erties or characteristics, subject to continuous varia-
tions which are accepted or transmitted in differential
form by human populations.49
Gallino's interpretation proposes in this sense that
each technologic system and its successive replicas, are
gradually modified in time, so that at a given moment
a technologic «population» will present a distribution
of variants different from the preceding moments: that
which Darwinially is understood by evolution and
which in modern synthesis is defined as a micro-evolu-
tion. In no way is it missing from this reading the pos-
sibility that systems could appear, capable of introduc-
ing structurally new processes and functions: «it is the
equivalent —writes Gallino— of the typologic leaps of
the living being which are defined as macro-evolution,
and there are good reasons to believe that they are not
derivable from micro-evolution».50 A phenomenon,
that of the leap, destined to give place to technologic
systems which, although they obey the logic of surviv-
al of the fittest, can substitute precedents but also co-
exist with them, creating complementary positions.
The reading of Gallino shows how the recourse to
an evolutionary model (in which classic Darwinian
thinking converges with the elements of modern syn-
thesis) for the interpretation of non-biologic phenom-
ena can go beyond the heuristic sense of metaphoric
procedure to open up to the wider perspective of the
co-evolutionary vision which sees biology, technology,
and social and cultural processes as links of a general
evolution.
The transposal, proposed by Gallino himself, of the
concept of «biologic idoneity» to the field of technolo-
gy represents a later development of this focus.
In the definition formulated by Medawar,51 idonei-
ty in biology is configured as a combined function that
includes as much the survival of an individual as the
multiplication of the offspring. This means that the
longer an individual survives, the wider its period of
potential for reproduction. Every element —function-
al, morphologic or adaptive— destined to make the
idoneity of an individual or a population row, can con-
stitute an adaptation that can be transmitted to de-
scendents or that can be lost. Completely new traits
can also appear in a population. Consequently, «a pop-
ulation that exhibits a distribution of significantly var-
iant traits compared to the population from which it
descends, will have suffered an evolution».52
An analogous logic seems applicable to technologic
systems, considering that the contemporary ones de-
scend from preceding ones and presumably make up
the progenitors of future ones, and that these systems
will contribute in a more relevant way than others to
future developments. In this sense, an analogous con-
cept of technologic idoneity is applicable, which im-
plies an interaction of three orders of populations: hu-
man organisms, technologic systems and socio-cultural
systems, in a co-evolutionary circuit where human
populations influence the idoneity of technologic sys-
tems and, through these, on biologic and socio-cultur-
al evolution. As Gallino writes,
organisms of the first order (human beings) selectively
use organisms of the second (technologic systems) to
reproduce themselves and to reproduce organisms of
the third order (socio-cultural systems) [...]; acting
thus, they accelerate the evolution of technologic sys-
tems and their dependence on these, with long-term ef-
fects on their own probability of collective survival.
This circuit has not till now been the product of an in-
tentional design, nor are there signs that it is becoming
so; more likely it is the emerging product of innumera-
ble sequences of individual choices. Through their tech-
nologic choices, each social actor joins in determining
the future of its species."
49. Gallino, L., L'attore sociale. Biologia, cultura e intelli-
genza artificíale, Einaudi, Turin, 1987, p. 181.
50. ¡bid., p. 182.
51. Medawac, P. B., «The Meaning of Fitness and the Future
of Man», in Cohen, Y. A., Man in Adaptation. The Biological
Background, Aldine Chicago, 1974, 2nd ed., pp. 30-40.
52. Cfr. Gallino, L., op. cit., p. 185.
53. Ibid., p. 186.
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The technologic populations that will descend from
the contemporary ones will be the result of these choic-
es, carried out in a relationship between technology
and society which «goes through states of intermittent
balance»54 in the process of co-evolution between biol-
ogy and culture. The states of balance can be described
as stages of an evolution of which it can be said that it
proceeds by successive appearances of technologic
populations. To affirm that a preceding technologic
stage makes the succeeding one possible without form-
ing it means also to recognize a certain degree of dis-
continuity —and with it a possible mutational charac-
teristic— traditionally lacking from any historic
reconstruction of technologic change. The idea of the
appearance, however, is linked to that of integration,
because the appearance of a technologic population
does not necessarily imply the disappearance of the
preceding one.
An insuperable distance separates this systematic
reading of technologic evolution from the literary met-
aphors and genealògic reconstructions of objects.
There is, however, a point of contact toward which, in
different scale, the phenomena studied seem to con-
verge.
When Samuel Butler, «almost frightened by the im-
mense development reached by the mechanical king-
dom»,55 prefigured machines parents of other ma-
chines, machines directed to supremacy, autonomous
machines, he anticipated with eighteenth-century liter-
ary emphasis this vision of technology as a self-distanc-
ing system which modernity faces in all its extensions.
«It may be that never —writes Gallino today, prefigur-
ing the same image as Butler— did technologic systems
operate among us expressing a conscience and will of
their own»,56 but apart from the metaphors and in the
light of co-evolutionary dynamics, the same systems
seem in such cases to evolve mainly in function of
«their» reproductive interests and not those of the bio-
logic and socio-cultural systems of which they are an
integrating part. The dependence of human systems on
technology goes so far as to assign as Gallino writes,
«an absolute priority to the maintenance of the condi-
tions of survival of technologic systems». Thus it can
claim to impose on individuals and groups behaviours
which diminish their biologic and cultural idoneity
(thus defined as a gigantic entropic mechanism, which
on one hand constantly introduces novelties which are
self-organizing, and on the other substraéis flexibility
and impoverishes the wider system of which it forms a
part) end up being no more controlable on the whole,
as if they depended on autonomous propulsive dynam-
57
1CS.
The morphogenetic nature of innovation
The adoption of an evolutionary paradigm for the
study of not only mechanisms of technologic change,
but also of the economic-industrial system on the
whole, is in its turn motivated by wide-ranging rea-
sons: industrial capitalism has been, in fact, considered
as an intrinsically evolutionary system,58 capable of
containing the elements and forces of a self-propelling
change which can modify as much technologic systems
as economic and cultural meshes.
In the hypothesis of an evolutionary theory of in-
dustrial production, the rereading of the innovative
process plays a basic role: if in fact the possible genetic
processes of the new can have an origin, as traditional-
ly understood, in economic demands or objectives, it is
also true, however, that this happens inside a «multi-
causal» web of events.
The new —it has been observed— is definitely not
produced in the obsolete laboratory of the theory of the
traditional company, where the causes of economic
change are always exogenous and where adaptation to
these exterior impulses takes place with purely endoga-
mous variables.59
Overcoming the traditional concept based on exog-
enous variables (as a cause of change) and endogenous
variables (effects) has been produced by admitting a
systematic conception of industrial production and the
environment in which it operates. In this context,
change takes place in relation to economic and non-
economic impulses, and, therefore, gives shape to eco-
nomic and non-economic effects, without altering the
system as a whole.
But the step from a systematic concept of the in-
dustrial system to an evolutionary concept goes further
54. Ibid., p. 191.
55. Butler, S., «Darwin e le macchine», op. cit., p. 142.
56. Gallino, L., op. cit., p. 207.
57. Ibid.
58. Di Bernardo, E. and Rullani, E., op. cit., p. 43.
59. Ibid., p. 47.
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and implies the recognition of an innovative process
which
does not reproduce the system per se, without varying
structures, the rules of behaviour, and the values prop-
er to the systematic mesh at a given moment, but rather
acts as an element of change of the system itself, the
«production» of the identity of the system at different
moments.60
In the framework of research and experimental
analysis on the economy of new technologies,61 specif-
ic individual elements have already been highlighted
which can join together for the formulation of a theo-
ry of innovation on the model of the evolutionary par-
adigm. For example, the concept of «morphogenesis»
has been introduced, as a production of complex forms
(complex innovations) that are differentiated as much
from precise traditional innovations as from processes
of transition. By morphogenesis we are to understand
in this case the capacity of a system to create new
structural forms in its interior. In the evolutionary con-
cept, therefore, change constitutes not so much a dis-
turbance of structures that remain unvariable as one
that is present as a resource of the system itself.
In this sense, the term «evolution» becomes synon-
ymous with the web of connections that links precise
innovations and processes of transition, carrying out
new systematic forms in the technologic field. From
this comes the morphogenetic function, precisely as the
production of new orders.
Contrary, therefore, to innovations that do not
change the system as a whole, and the processes that,
although complex, «design changes that begin and end
without giving continuity to change»,62 the true object
of analysis of an evolutionary theory of technologic
change is drawn in a new type of innovation, which
represents a complex process capable of organizing
macro-mutations. In close analogy with natural sci-
ence, concrete innovations appear in this way linked
by an evolutionary design which allows for the accu-
mulation of micro-mutations, which, in their turn,
produce complex forms that are reaffirmed as substi-
tutes of those which preceded them.63
60. Ibid., p. 49.
61. Ibid., p. 52.
62. Ibid.
63. «It is this process —underline Di Bernardo and Rul-
lani— which has evolutionary value and which represents an
object of study different from the traditional theory of the com-
pany and that used in more usual theories about innovation»
(ibid., p. 58).
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